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Abstract 
After decades of equity oriented urban policies, the advent of neo-liberalism and the more 
recent great recession have led to their successive dismantling. On the other hand, these 
developments, coupled with continuing massive immigration, have led to a call for a ‘just 
city’ agenda (Fainstein, 2010) where policies and planning are directed towards equity, 
diversity and citizen participation rather than growth and cultural protectionism. Given the 
difficult economic and social environment, however, it is not clear whether such an agenda 
finds political support even at the level of cities.  
In this paper, we put forward both a descriptive and an explanatory research question. Firstly, 
can we find local political support for the ‘just city’ ideal in Europe? Secondly, what are the 
local conditions conducive to embracing this ideal? Building on a recent European survey of 
city mayors, we present a first assessment of local orientations towards the ‘just city’. Our 
cluster-analysis reveals a substantial share of favourably inclined mayors spread unequally 
across European countries. Capitalizing on subnational variation in mayoral attitudes, our 
multivariate regressions confirm a strong positive association with leftist party ideology, 
while also identifying favourable conditions for Christian and conservative mayors (medium-
sized cities, low influence of the business sector). Strong voluntary associations, in contrast, 
are rather associated with participatory and egalitarian mayoral attitudes, but not with a 
positive stance towards diversity. Moreover, the positive predisposition of leftist mayors 
seems to wain with increasing dependency on EU funding. The exploratory study thus opens 
new avenues for further research. 
 
Keywords 





Social injustice in the city has long been a characteristic of advanced urban societies. From 
the workhouses of industrialising European cities in the mid-19th century, through post war 
inequalities that were addressed through the establishment of the welfare state, to mass social 
housing programmes in the 1960s, social injustices, and policies to address them, have been 
on the political agenda of cities for some two centuries. Despite the benefits of these policies 
for addressing social justice in the city, it has been argued that, from the 1980s, the rise of the 
so-called ‘neo-liberal city’ has exacerbated social divisions and broadened urban inequalities 
over the past 40 years. Through a combination of de-industrialisation, the rise of post-
Fordism, the erosion of the welfare state, and the impact of the financial crisis of 2008, 
European urban areas are facing severe economic and social pressures that continue to 
threaten the goal of social justice in the city, or in other words, the ideal of ‘The just city’ 
(Fainstein, 2010).  
Even though urban policies are to some extent formulated and shaped at national and 
even EU levels, it is at the level of cities were these growing social divisions and spatial 
inequalities are most directly felt. It is also at the level of cities where elected politicians and 
officials make important day-to-day decisions in implementing these policies and steering 
urban development: Should public funds be directed towards the tourist waterfront or rather 
towards improving public housing conditions for a peripheral neighbourhood? Should 
housing and zoning policies aim for socially-mixed neighbourhoods? Today, these local 
choices are taken in an environment of fiscal stress and widespread anti-immigrant sentiment. 
Yet to date we know very little about local officials’ stances on these questions. And we know 
nothing about their attitudes towards the ideal of the ‘just city’ more generally. 
In this explorative study, we take a bottom-up perspective on urban policies across 
Europe, focusing on local political leaders, the city mayors, and their attitudes towards the 
policies that we see as conducive to the ‘just city’. Our analysis pursues a twofold aim, a more 
descriptive one, and an explanatory one. The descriptive research question is stated as 
follows: can we find local political support for the ‘just city’ ideal in Europe? The explanatory 
research question reads: what are the local conditions conducive to embracing this ideal?  
Of course, a general local political support for the just city does not necessarily 
translate into corresponding actions. Local authorities may lack the necessary legal and 
financial means as well as a supportive national policy environment. Nonetheless, favourable 
attitudes towards the just city ideal clearly constitute a necessary precondition from which 
local public action may follow. Therefore, we believe that the investigation of mayoral 
attitudes and their conditioning factors offers a valuable starting point for identifying fertile 
grounds for building the ‘just cities’ of tomorrow.     
The paper is structured as follows. We first elaborate on the criteria of the ‘just city’ 
ideal as developed by urban scholar Susan Fainstein (2010), before presenting hypotheses on 
the role of local conditions and European funding opportunities for explaining local variation 
in political support for corresponding policies. Based on a recent European survey of city 
mayors (POLLEADER II) we then investigate mayoral clusters and their distribution across 
European countries. In a next step, we perform multivariate regression analyses for testing our 
hypotheses at the level of cities. We conclude with observations on cities led by mayors 
supporting the ‘just city’ ideal, and call for further research to study local and national 
specificities in more depth, to understand political processes that could lead to just city 
policies in the future.  
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The ‘just city’ 
What constitutes a just city and how to arrive there are, of course, highly contested issues. If 
we take John Rawls’ (1971) classical theory of justice as a point of departure, we can 
conceive of a society as fair and just, if people would have accepted existing societal 
conditions in the ‘original position’, under the ‘veil of ignorance’, not knowing their 
individual traits such as skills, physical conditions, gender, ethnicity, health or employment 
status. In contrast to utilitarian conceptions, the focus shifts from aggregate welfare to 
distributional considerations, making sure that individual opportunities and satisfaction of the 
least-advantaged members of society are not constrained by policies simply aiming at 
maximizing the total sum of satisfaction or ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. 
Even though Rawls’ liberal theory of justice does not specifically take urban or spatial issues 
into consideration, it has become the common starting point of much theorization on social 
justice in the city, most prominently in ‘The just city’ by Susan Fainstein (2010) from an 
urban planning perspective, and in ‘Seeking spatial justice’ by urban geographer Edward Soja 
(2010).  
Clearly, such place-based revisionist concepts of social justice have been criticized 
from the Marxist side for assuming that social justice can coexist with the current global 
capitalist order, neglecting the need for constant struggle and a more profound transformation 
of relations of production (e.g., Harvey and Potter, 2009; Souza, 2011). Both Fainstein and 
Soja put forward non-Marxist formulations of social justice for pragmatic reasons: they are 
concerned with correcting the most pressing social injustices under existing social 
frameworks, enabling broad political coalitions and inciting more radical reforms at local, 
intermediary and global scales over time (Fainstein, 2010: 18; Soja, 2011: 100). 
In this paper, we build heavily on Susan Fainstein’s (2010) encompassing elaboration 
of both the theoretical underpinnings of ‘the just city’ and the policies and planning practices 
that she judges as conducive to it. Most notably, she proposes three criteria of social justice – 
equity, diversity and democracy – and related principles to guide policy and planning that we 
have summarized in the first two columns of Table 1. Similar criteria were also highlighted by 
Fincher and Iveson (2008), and their inter-relationships with questions of social cohesion, 
social mobility and economic performance have also been investigated for 14 ‘hyper-
diversified’ cities across Europe (Taşan-Kok et al., 2017). 
For Fainstein, equity, as her preferred criterion of social justice, “refers to a 
distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy that does not 
favour those who are already better off at the beginning” (Fainstein, 2010: 36). This criterion 
is motivated by the view that deindustrialization and globalization have led city leaders to 
focus narrowly on growth-promoting policies serving the interests of developers and 
downtown businesses, while neglecting the needs of peripheral neighbourhoods and depriving 
disadvantaged population groups of housing and employment opportunities (Fainstein, 2010: 
1–3). Rather than bridging the perceived trade-off between growth and equity through 
investment in schools and qualification programmes, politicians would prefer to undertake 
‘hard’ expenditure in buildings and infrastructure for the sake of visible short-term outcomes 
(Fainstein, 2010: 81). 
Although acknowledging the equity implications of the broader spectrum of public 
policies, Fainstein’s discussion of just city planning principles centres mainly on housing and 
urban regeneration (Fainstein, 2010: 172–173). As for the US, she condemns the continued 
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reliance on home ownership programmes for the middle class and stigmatizing public housing 
for the poorest. Regarding Europe, she laments the privatization and demolition of the mass-
produced public housing stock. While Fainstein welcomes the trend towards mixed-income 
developments and rent supplements in both contexts, she cautions that the retreat of the state 
leads to stronger dependence on market forces and possible discrimination through private 
owners (Fainstein, 2010: 77–80). She therefore calls for stronger government involvement in 
the housing market, complemented with an incremental reconstruction of neighbourhoods, 
making a “kind of justice impact statement when choosing particular strategies” and 
preventing the mass-displacement of low-income residents (Fainstein, 2010: 166, 175–178). 
With her second criterion of social justice, diversity, Fainstein borrows from the post-
structuralist critique that liberal individualism would fail to account for nonmaterial forms of 
oppression caused by group-based difference (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and 
culture). She cites Iris Marion Young, stating that “[s]ocial justice requires not the melting 
away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group 
differences without oppression” (1990, 47, cited in Fainstein, 2010: 43). Following Young, 
emancipation requires the rejection of the assimilationist model and the possibility for a social 
group to define its own identity rather than one being imposed from outside (Fainstein, 2010: 
43). In terms of housing policies, it seems counter-productive to force relocation of residents 
into a possibly hostile environment (Fainstein, 2010: 74–75). Instead, land use policies are to 
restrict new constructions furthering segregation of neighbourhoods and schools, while 
allowing for voluntary ethnic enclaves provided that the boundaries remain porous (Fainstein, 
2010: 68, 76, 174). 
Fainstein’s third criterion, democracy, she sees as valuable for social justice only as 
far as it helps achieve the substantial criteria of equity and diversity, and she makes clear that 
the potential of democracy has been overstated in the literature on participatory and 
deliberative planning. Participatory mechanisms, in her view, have become a vehicle for 
middle-class interests, thereby democratizing bureaucratic planning processes but not in the 
direction of redistribution. Moreover, the legitimacy of neighbourhood activists claiming to 
represent a broad constituency has always been suspect to her, and if they are not backed by 
widespread mobilization they would be unlikely to make a difference (Fainstein, 2010: 66–
67). 
Democratic theory more broadly has, in Fainstein’s view, failed to show how to ensure 
“adequate representation of all interests in a large, socially divided group, protecting against 
demagoguery, achieving more than token public participation, preventing economically or 
institutionally powerful interests from defining the agenda, and maintaining minority rights” 
(Fainstein, 2010: 29). If politics in culturally divided societies is based on coalitions, she asks, 
how can we expect social emancipation to come from a “coalition of out-groups that share 
little but their antagonism to the extant social hierarchy?” (Fainstein, 2010: 52). Social 
programmes, she concludes, depend on a combination of pressure from below, political-
bureaucratic receptiveness at national and local level, and majoritarian support by the broader 
public and by centre-left coalitions in the case of Europe. Accordingly, social programmes 
and redevelopment policies were often based on coalitions involving down-town business and 
conservative segments of the population, resulting in suburbanization and further segregation 








Principles of just urban policy and 
planning 
Survey items (POLLEADER II) 
Equity/ 
redistribution 
Resolve the trade-off between growth 
and equity in favour of social benefits 
and investment in human capital 
• Housing: mixed-income housing 
developments, preserved pool of 
affordable housing units, regulated 
housing market, public subsidies, 
public ownership, land banking policies 
• Land use/urban renewal: densification 
yet incremental reconstruction of 
neighbourhoods, limiting involuntary 
displacement of low-income people, 
require direct benefits to low-income 
people 
• Public services and amenities: 
affordable public transportation, high 
quality public schools, accessible 
health services and facilities 
Policy agenda placing high priority to: B. “To 
develop social policies to secure adequate 
housing, health care, education, public 
transport facilities and take care of the needs 
of vulnerable groups (the elderly, the young, 
the unemployed etc.)”  
• Disagreement with statement: “The 
market is the best way to attend housing 
needs” 
• Importance of development strategy: G. 
“anticipate the environmental and social 
impacts of projects” 
• Preferred form of service delivery (public 
rather than public-private-partnership or 
private): Public transport, maintenance of 
school buildings, hospitals, care homes for 
the elderly 
Rather than policy agenda placing high 




Promote reproduction of and respect for 
group differences without oppression, 
rather than forcing assimilation 
• Housing: No forced relocations of 
residents for the purpose of diversity 
but prevent exclusion based on 
gender, ethnicity, homelessness etc. 
• Land use/urban renewal: Restrict 
constructions furthering segregation, 
inclusionary zoning, porous 
boundaries between districts 
• Public space: ample and varied public 
space accessible for all 
• Social programmes: affirmative action 
in housing, education, employment 
Policy agenda placing high priority to: I. “To 
improve the integration of ethnic, religious or 
cultural minorities and emphasize diversity 
and tolerance in the local community 
Rather than to: F. “To preserve the local 
identity and the locality’s traditional lifestyle” 
Democracy Citizen participation with fair 
representation of interests of 
disadvantaged groups 
• Groups that are not able to 
participate directly should be 
represented by advocates 
• Development of plans in consultation 
with target population, yet city-wide 
considerations must also apply 
• Broad consultation for developing 




• Disagreement with: Apart from voting, 
citizens should not be given the 
opportunity to influence local government 
policies 
• Agreement with: Residents should have 
the opportunity to make their views 
known before important local decisions 
are made by elected representatives 
• Importance of development strategy: E. 





Assessment of local political support for the just city 
Given Fainstein’s scepticism towards elected politicians and participatory arrangements, she 
puts her hopes into urban planners and advises them to use their expertise against their 
‘political masters’, presenting who gets the benefits and who bears the costs, making use of 
deliberative arrangements and citizen activism by pressing for egalitarian and inclusive 
solutions while blocking contrary proposals (Fainstein, 2010: 173, 181). Yet Fainstein is well 
aware that it takes supportive elected officials for urban planners to assume such a role and 
for a just city vision to be actually implemented – in the field of planning, and even more so 
in the field of social policies. 
Here we deliberately focus on the side of the potential political support that justice-
oriented planners and public officials might receive from political urban leaders. Even though 
there has been comparative research on policy orientations of political elites across Europe, 
this paper marks the first effort to engage specifically with the concept of the just city in 
policy making and planning. More specifically, we draw from the POLLEADER II survey 
(Heinelt et al., 2018), directed to all mayors of cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants in 28 
countries across Europe (average response rate of 39%) questioned between the years 2015 
and 2016. 
Based on the survey items listed in the third column of Table 1, we have built three 
indices for evaluating mayoral attitudes against the normative framework by Fainstein. One 
for favouring equity over growth, another for favouring diversity over assimilation, and the 
third for participatory democracy.1 The exact phrasing of the survey items and the applied 
aggregation rules can be found in the appendix (Tables 5 and 6).  
The first two indices are differential measures for the degree to which just city 
orientations dominate over the concern for either growth, or for identity and traditional 
lifestyle – the assimilationist model. High values on these two indices thus indicate a rather 
favourable relation, whereas low values indicate a relative domination of concerns for growth 
or cultural protectionism, respectively. In practice, of course, mayors need not perceive these 
two suggested ends as a trade-off and may indicate high or low values on both, resulting in an 
intermediate position on these scales. The purpose of the scales is uniquely to identify mayors 
with clear preferences on the alternatives implied in the concept of the just city. 
Rather than relying on the three indices alone, we perform a cluster analysis in order 
to identify types of mayors depending on how they combine the three indices. This is 
                                                 
1 For the dependent variable ‘equity over growth’, the initial step was a factor analysis of four items (importance 
of developing social policies on the policy agenda, public service delivery, role of the market for attending 
housing needs, importance of anticipating the environmental and social impacts of project). From this analysis, 
one factor could be retained with an Eigenvalue above 1. It was standardized to a minimum of 0 and a maximum 
of 100. Finally, the priority of the agenda ‘To stimulate economic growth and employment’, likewise 
standardized to the range 0 to 100 was subtracted from the factor and the resulting variable was standardized 
again to the range -50 to +50. 
For the dependent variable ‘diversity’, the agenda priority of ‘preserving the local identity and the locality’s 
traditional lifestyle’ was subtracted from the agenda priority of ‘improving the integration of ethnic, religious or 
cultural minorities and emphasizing diversity and tolerance in the local community’. Resulting values were 
standardized to the range -50 to +50. 
The dependent variable ‘participatory democracy’ has been the result of a factor analysis with three items 
(citizen involvement apart from voting, citizen involvement before important local decisions are made, citizen 
involvement in defining important territorial priorities). From this analysis, one factor could be retained with an 




important, since a just city agenda requires the “maximization of the three values” of equity, 
diversity and democracy (Fainstein, 2010: 166). Political support for the just city would imply 
at least a slight preference for equity and diversity as compared to growth and assimilation 
respectively, possibly complemented with a positive predisposition towards empowered 
participation of affected residents.  
As is true of any analysis of survey data, we need to be aware of possible biases. 
Survey data might be biased due to the self-selection of survey participants. Also, there will 
be biased responses due to ‘social desirability’ (DeMaio, 1984). There is reason to believe 
that the items relating to the concept of the just city might be particularly prone to 
misreporting biases, because they were formed from the assessment of various public policies 
(Funk, 2016). In the absence of readily available alternative sources on mayoral preferences 
(or actions), we will proceed with the necessary caution when interpreting the results.  
Working hypotheses 
Our study is explorative in that we are interested to identify local political support for a just 
city agenda and to demarcate such inclinations from other possible political orientations, and 
to find distributional patterns across Europe as well as within single countries. Underlying our 
study is the general assumption, that the strong competition between cities, continuing fiscal 
pressures in several countries and growing anti-immigrant sentiments will be favouring local 
concerns for growth and a cultural protectionist attitude, yet that there might be cities resisting 
such general trends by embracing the ideals of the just city. At the level of cross-national 
differences in mayoral attitudes, we limit ourselves to a descriptive analysis, where discussion 
of possible factors contributing to distributional patterns must remain necessarily fluid. There 
is a range of possible factors, beginning with national welfare state traditions (Esping-
Andersen, 1990), conceptions of citizenship (Koopmans, 2005), level of economic 
development, dominant political ideology, degree and form of decentralisation, possible 
trends of Europeanization (Olsen, 2002), current national reforms, fiscal crises following the 
great recession of 2008, and many more. With only 28 countries, it is impossible to 
disentangle the precise effect of these often highly correlated factors. Instead, our more 
systematic analyses focus on the city level, exploiting the leverage offered by over 1000 
observations spread across these countries. 
Our first set of working hypotheses for explaining the variation of just city orientations 
between European cities focuses on the role of political ideologies. Firstly, we expect leftist 
mayors to combine a concern for equity and diversity, the two central criteria for a just city, as 
opposed to mayors positioning themselves rather on the political right. Previous research on 
mayoral agendas showed a clear correspondence between leftist political orientations and the 
pursuit of agendas focusing on problem-solving and social sustainability, while right wing 
mayors were more likely to follow agendas focusing on growth and preserving the local 
community (Cabria et al., 2018; Magnier et al., 2006). In fact, going beyond the simple left-
right scale, research on national party positions across Europe (Kitschelt, 1994) has confirmed 
for leftist parties both a pro-state position on the economic dimension (as opposed to pro-
market), as well as a liberal view on a so-called cultural dimension (as opposed to a traditional 
authoritarian perspective). These two dimensions of the political space in European countries, 
which have arguably been reinforced with globalization and European integration (Kriesi et 
al., 2006), quite nicely correspond to the axes of equity vs. growth and diversity vs. ethnic 
protectionism considered in the conceptualization of the just city. Since the cultural dimension 
at the national scale even subsumes the participatory and anti-authoritarian values introduced 
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with the social movements of the 1960s, we might expect mayors from leftist parties to 
support all three components of the just city: equity, diversity and participatory democracy. 
Secondly, and as suggested by Susan Fainstein, conservative Christian politicians in 
Europe may also be involved in centre-left coalitions pushing for some, possibly more 
restrained, forms of equitable policies at the national and local level. Accordingly, we might 
hypothesise a stronger alignment to the just city ideal by Christian and conservative mayors as 
compared to their colleagues standing further to the political right. Of course, Christian and 
conservative politicians in Europe cannot be regarded as a homogenous group, so we will 
certainly find Christian and conservative mayors varying on the left-right self-positioning as 
well as in their attitudes towards equity, diversity and participatory democracy. Again, 
making recourse to research on national party positions across Europe, Christian and 
conservative parties would be expected to take a middle stance on both the economic and the 
cultural dimension (Kriesi et al., 2006). We would expect then the attitudes of mayors from 
liberal parties to be positioned further away from the just city ideal, ‘liberal’ being understood 
in this context as more conservative, common in the European context (as opposed to a 
centre-left variant associated with liberalism in North America). Even if these may surpass 
Christian and conservative party members in terms of cultural openness, as confirmed in the 
political party literature, their decidedly market-oriented attitudes would stand in direct 
conflict with state regulations directed towards equity. We would expect mayors from right 
wing parties to be the most averse to the just city ideal, given their decidedly culturally 
protectionist and possibly more authoritarian stance, often coupled with a marked-oriented 
position on the economic dimension (cp. Kriesi et al., 2006). 
The second set of working hypotheses is concerned with local power structures 
possibly conditioning the attitudes of mayors, apart from their political party membership. 
The alleged shift from government to governance has meant that a multiplicity of actors from 
the political, administrative, economic and social sphere are involved in developing, deciding 
and implementing urban planning and urban policies (Le Galès, 2002; da Cruz et al., 2019). 
Drawing from urban governance approaches and urban regime theory, we would expect that 
mayoral agendas are to some extent dependent on local power structures as well as on the way 
urban political leaders decide to mobilize and involve particular stakeholders and population 
groups in urban policy making and planning. More progressive and redistributive urban policy 
agendas require broad governing coalitions involving not only the business sector, but also 
broad segments of the society such as strong voluntary associations (Pierre, 2011; Stone, 
1989). Accordingly, we would regard a strong reported political influence by voluntary 
associations to indicate a local political context favourable for sustaining more ambitious 
mayoral policy attitudes with regard to the just city, including equity, growth and 
participatory democracy. Conversely, a strong reported influence by the local business sector 
would rather seem to sustain growth-oriented mayoral attitudes, less concerned with issues of 
equity, diversity and citizen participation. 
Additionally, we formulate a working hypothesis on European funding opportunities 
and differential processes of Europeanization depending on a city’s engagement with 
European cohesion programmes (Carpenter, 2013; Hamedinger and Wolffhardt, 2010). 
Processes of ‘download’ Europeanization suggest that EU policies can affect domestic 
policies, practices and preferences following the implementation of EU programmes 
(Marshall, 2005). However, the actual impact of Europeanization will depend in part on the 
policy ‘misfit’ between the EU and local levels, where adaptational pressures might lead to 
domestic policy transformation through processes of convergence (Börzel and Risse, 2000). 
The European Union encourages integrated programs and locally empowering projects 
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directed towards deprived neighbourhoods and discriminated minorities – very much in line 
with the just city ideal – both within the European Structural and Investment Funds as well as 
within the Pre-accession Assistance schemes – even if with variable success (see Atkinson, 
2015; Scheurer and Haase, 2018). Support from EU funding opportunities could therefore 
have an influence on a mayor’s attitudes to just city policies, because of his or her interaction 
with the principles of social justice that are embedded within EU funding programmes.  
Besides individual control variables regarding age, gender and education, we also 
account for city characteristics possibly related to the mayoral attitudes under consideration. 
Regarding the impact of the financial crisis of 2008, Fainstein at her time was cautious of 
making any interpretations. Even though she observed protests and riots in some cities, they 
had not transposed into larger disturbances, and much would depend on the “ideological 
framework through which the crisis is interpreted” (Fainstein, 2010: 182). Next to the fiscal 
situation of a city, we also account for population size and city type: issues of equity, diversity 
and participatory democracy may be more pressing or more amenable depending on its 
position in the urban hierarchy, ranging from large urban centres, the wider agglomeration 
and more peripheral areas. 
Mayoral Clusters and Cross-National Patterns 
Based on the three indices equity, diversity and participatory democracy, we have identified 
four mayoral clusters, depicting their characteristic positioning in this three dimensional space 
(cp. Figure 1).2 Specifically, we find one cluster of mayors that most closely corresponds to 
the ‘just city’ ideal, even though we need to be aware of possible biases due to social 
desirability. These mayors aim to promote diversity and tolerance rather than traditional 
identity and policies directed to social equity are clearly more prominent than the concern for 
economic growth. Moreover, there is sizeable support for participatory democracy in 
policymaking and planning. Mayors of the participatory cluster, in turn, are strongly 
committed to participatory democracy and they share the commitment to diversity, but they 
tend to give more weight to growth than to equity. The elitist cluster holds a similar position, 
except it shows the lowest inclination towards participatory democracy. The competitive 
cluster, as we call it, is characterized by valuing the conservation of the traditional identity 
higher than the value of diversity, giving growth promotion clear precedence over equity, 
while exposing moderate support for participatory democracy.  
On the grounds of the cluster analysis and the frequency table by country (Table 2), 
we are now in a position to check our general assumption regarding the propensity of just city 
orientations of urban political leaders across Europe. Contrary to our cautious expectation, we 
do find substantial shares of political urban leaders that tend to favour policies corresponding 
to the just city ideal, although the share varies widely between countries, ranging from 12.5 
percent to 40 percent. Here we should note that the differences between countries cannot be 
                                                 
2 We estimated the cluster analysis with Stata version 14.2 and followed the procedure suggested and outlined by 
Mooi et al. (2018). The squared Euclidean distance is used as the method for assessing similarity, because the 
variables used have a metric scale. As suggested by Milligan (1980), we first performed a hierarchical clustering 
method to determine the number of clusters. More specifically, we used Ward’s method, a clustering approach, 
where groups are joined based on the error-sum-of-squares criteria. The results indicated that a four-cluster 
solution performs best in terms of both Duda/Hart indices computed by the program (see appendix, Table 8). We 
then applied an iterative partition-clustering method (K-means cluster analysis), where the number of clusters is 
consequently set to four. As claimed by several authors (e.g., Clatworthy et al., 2005; Mooi et al., 2018), the 
validity of clusters has to be established. For this purpose, we compare the clustering results from the ward’s 
linkage analysis to the K-means cluster analysis. The results show an overlap of roughly 60 percent, which is 
satisfactory (see appendix, Table 9). 
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taken at face value, given the fact that biases due to social desirability might be more 
pronounced in some cultures than in others (cp. Funk, 2016). Moreover, these expressed 
attitudes of mayors need not correspond to the actually implemented policies in their 
particular city. Rather, what these measures seek to assess is the potential local political 
support that justice-oriented planners and public officials might receive when drafting plans 
and social policies, always constrained by national and regional legislation and the fiscal 
means available to the city. 
Although we do find a general pattern of more developed economies at the top of the table 
and the less prosperous countries entitled to Cohesion funds and Pre-accession assistance at 
the lower end, we also encounter various countries punctuating this broader pattern (Table 2). 
On the one hand, we find surprisingly high shares in the Cohesion countries of Croatia and 
Hungary at the top of the table.3 On the other hand, we also find the relatively prosperous 
countries of Switzerland and England at the very bottom of the table. Clearly, then, the 
national economic situation is only part of the story and must be related to considerations of 
the political ideologies in the countries under investigation. The majority of surveyed mayors 
of Austria, Sweden, Italy, France and Spain expressed a left wing party membership, 
contrasting with Switzerland with the highest share of liberal and right wing party members. 
In England, the neo-liberal ethos that has permeated politics and policies since the 1980s runs 
deep, with mayors giving high priority to economic growth rather than just city policies, 
excluding those cities from the ‘just city’ cluster. 
Less obvious, however, is the explanation for the exceptionally high shares in the 
cohesion countries of Croatia and Hungary, both lacking widespread leftist strongholds across 
the cities. A closer look at the configuration of the national party systems might help explain 
these two cases. In Hungary, the social and economic dimensions do not correlate positively 
as in most European countries. In fact, on the social dimension even right-wing parties 
support issues from economic left-wing parties (Bakker et al., 2012: 227–230). Also in 
Croatia, the economic cleavage (free market vs. state intervention) is not reflected in the arena 
of political party competition (see Dolenec, 2012: 71). Yet even if considering national 
particularities in terms of both economic situation and political ideology, it remains difficult 
to satisfactorily explain the ordering of countries based on such general concepts. 
The fact that mayors in Cohesion and Pre-accession countries only seldom aspire to 
the just city ideal further illustrates how EU assistance in most Cohesion countries and all Pre-
accession countries considered here has not necessarily increased the willingness of urban 
political leaders to invest in more equitable and inclusive policies. While a lack of local 
support for the values of equity and inclusion might actually be hampering the success of EU 
Cohesion and Pre-accession policies, the result makes clear how the economy really is the 
most pressing problem in many of these countries. 
 
 
                                                 
3 For the case of Hungary, a pioneering socially oriented engagement in terms of EU funded urban renewal has 
been documented by Tosics (2011). In 2007, the relevant Hungarian ministry made a city-wide Integrated Urban 
Development Strategy compulsory for urban renewal actions financed through the European Regional 
Development Fund. The strategy has to address segregation in the city including housing, education, social and 
health-care facilities. 
Figure 1: Single items of the four mayoral clusters (mean values) 
    
 
    
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Share of mayors assigned to various clusters by country, complemented with party memberships 






























Austria 40.0 23.3 13.3 23.3 53.3 33.3 0.0 3.3 10.0 30 EU 
Croatia 39.3 21.4 35.7 3.6 26.9 46.2 19.2 0.0 7.7 28 EU Cohesion country 
Belgium 38.5 20.2 20.2 21.2 19.8 37.1 28.4 0.0 14.7 104 EU 
Hungary 36.8 31.6 15.8 15.8 11.1 86.1 0.0 2.8 0.0 57 EU Cohesion country 
Sweden 34.2 21.6 17.1 27.0 63.3 23.4 0.8 0.0 12.5 111 EU 
Greece 33.7 31.4 11.6 23.3 43.9 56.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 86 EU Cohesion country 
Italy 33.5 24.7 17.0 24.7 88.7 6.1 0.0 0.0 5.2 182 EU 
France 32.7 18.2 21.8 27.3 94.4 0.0 0.0 5.6 0.0 55 EU 
Spain 28.1 43.7 7.4 20.8 56.9 21.3 0.0 0.0 21.8 231 EU 
Slovenia 25.0 25.0 35.0 15.0 16.7 25.0 0.0 0.0 58.3 20 EU Cohesion country 
Czech Rep. 23.9 26.1 43.5 6.5 54.5 45.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 46 EU Cohesion country 
Germany 22.0 32.9 18.8 26.3 43.6 50.6 2.5 0.0 3.2 490 EU 
Portugal 20.8 50.0 23.6 5.6 55.4 44.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 72 EU Cohesion country 
Poland 18.6 31.0 46.0 4.4 - - - - - 113 EU Cohesion country 
Lithuania 18.5 37.0 29.6 14.8 40.0 30.0 20.0 6.7 3.3 27 EU Cohesion country 
Albania 17.2 31.0 48.3 3.4 - - - - - 29 Pre-access. country 
Serbia 14.3 57.1 24.5 4.1 - - - - - 49 Pre-access. country 
Switzerland 13.8 28.7 25.3 32.2 31.5 21.3 31.5 14.6 1.1 87 Third country 
England 12.5 29.2 45.8 12.5 43.8 56.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 24 EU 
Total (abs.) 487 587 388 379 641 485 83 18 105 1841   
Countries sorted by share of mayors assigned to the ‘just city’ cluster. Values for Cyprus, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Norway, Romania and Slovakia not reported (low response 




Besides general prosperity and ideological orientation, we might also consider 
more immediate effects of the financial crisis or sentiments currently held by the 
broader population. The fiscal debt crises in Greece, Italy and Spain (but not in 
Portugal) might have reinforced the perceived need for redistributive policies at the 
local and national level. Along similar lines, the nationalist or socialist populist 
climate in Hungary and Greece (but not Poland) might equally have fuelled popular 
demands for equity (yet not necessarily for diversity). Given the aggregate nature of 
our cross-national analysis, the multiple collinearities between explanatory variables 
and the absence of deterministic relationships, we are left with these suggestions to be 
further validated through micro-level analyses (see below) and comparative in-depth 
case studies (future research). 
Explaining Variation between Cities 
After having performed a cross-national assessment of mayoral shares adhering to the 
just city ideal or otherwise, let us now turn to analysing the variation that we can find 
within countries at the level of cities and their political leaders. In order to address our 
sets of hypotheses formulated above, we seek to evaluate the role of party ideology, 
local power structures, European funding opportunities and additional city 
characteristics to explain why mayors are assigned to one cluster (say, the just city 
cluster), rather than another cluster (say, the competitive cluster).  
We thus performed a multinomial logistic regression with cluster assignment 
as the dependent variable, focusing on the likelihood of being assigned to the just city 
cluster as opposed to the three other clusters (the participatory cluster; the elitist 
cluster; and the competitive cluster) and the likelihood of being assigned to the 
participatory cluster as opposed to the competitive cluster (Table 3).4 
 
                                                 
4 According to Starkweather and Moske (2011), the method of multinomial logistic regression does not 
make assumptions about normality distribution, linearity or homoskedasticity. Diagnostics usually 
comprise tests for multicollinearity, influential and outlier cases and whether categories of the 
dependent variable should be combined (Williams, 2019; Long and Freese, 2006).  
For assessing whether multicollinearity is a problem, we computed collinearity diagnostics as in other 
binary models. Two common measures for multicollinearity are the variance inflation factor (VIF) and 
the tolerance (Long and Freese, 2006). If both measures are 1, variables are perfectly uncorrelated. The 
more collinear the variables are, the higher the VIF is, and the closer the tolerance is to zero. Following 
this rule of thumb, only the dummy variables created from nominal-scaled variables (city type) and the 
interaction terms are problematic (see appendix, Table 10). Because the approach of centering for 
interactions and omission of variables does usually not increase “statistical certainty of the estimated 
effects” (see Brambor et al., 2005: 70–71), those variables do not have to be dropped.  
In order to check for influential cases and potential outliers, four separate logistic regressions, one for 
each of the four clusters, were estimated first using Pregibonˈs method, a measure similar to Cookˈs 
distance known from OLS regressions (see Long and Freese, 2006: 151). In a second step, 10 
observations with a value higher than 0.3 and a substantial distance from the point clouds were 
excluded for all further analysis. 
A special test developed for multinomial logistic regressions answers the question whether two of the 
outcomes (i.e. clusters) are indistinguishable with respect to the variables in the model. If yes, estimates 
that are more efficient could result from combining them (Long and Freese, 2006: 239–243). The 




Table 3: Multinomial logistic regression results 
 (1) 
Just city vs. 
participatory 
(2) 
Just city vs. 
elitist 
(3) 






Party affiliation (reference: Christian/ 
conservative) 
    
- left wing 0.799*** 0.968*** 2.045*** 1.246*** 
 (3.85) (4.64) (8.32) (5.59) 
- liberal -0.578 -0.107 -0.859 -0.281 
 (-1.24) (-0.22) (-1.91) (-0.79) 
- right wing 0.0872 0.0363 -16.33 -16.41 
 (0.00) (0.00) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
- other -0.944 -0.878 -0.567 0.378 
 (-1.94) (-1.82) (-1.13) (1.17) 
Age 0.0132 0.00361 0.0175 0.00432 
 (1.35) (0.36) (1.51) (0.41) 
Gender -0.393 0.0678 -0.426 -0.0333 
 (-1.51) (0.27) (-1.33) (-0.11) 
Education -0.254 -0.0998 0.0411 0.295 
 (-1.58) (-0.64) (0.23) (1.72) 
Influence of voluntary associations (1-
5) 
-0.0138 0.141 0.330* 0.344** 
 (-0.12) (1.20) (2.45) (2.79) 
Influence of local businessmen (1-5) -0.136 -0.0373 -0.234 -0.0979 
 (-1.20) (-0.32) (-1.74) (-0.79) 
Dependency and cooperation with EU 
(1-5) 
-0.311*** -0.276*** -0.235** 0.0760 
(-4.01) (-3.51) (-2.63) (0.94) 
Perceived state of municipal finances 
(1-5) 
0.0346 -0.0490 -0.0269 -0.0615 
(0.39) (-0.55) (-0.26) (-0.67) 
City type (reference: city beyond a 
larger functional urban area) 
    
- core city of larger functional urban 
area 
2.693 7.853* 10.86** 8.164* 
 (0.79) (2.17) (2.68) (2.31) 
- commuting zone of larger functional 
urban area 
3.674 3.849 3.412 -0.261 
(1.01) (1.02) (0.77) (-0.07) 
Municipal population size (log.) -0.422 0.0540 -0.0129 0.409 
 (-1.87) (0.22) (-0.05) (1.83) 
- core city x population size -0.174 -0.677* -0.951* -0.777* 
 (-0.54) (-1.96) (-2.48) (-2.36) 
- commuting zone x population size -0.329 -0.369 -0.303 0.0264 
 (-0.90) (-0.97) (-0.68) (0.07) 
Constant 4.888* -0.694 -0.881 -5.770* 
 (2.06) (-0.28) (-0.32) (-2.44) 
N 1057 1057 1057 1057 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Missing data for five countries (see 
Table 2). 
 
As expected from the literature on national party positions on the economic 
and cultural dimension, we find that mayors with a left wing party affiliation have a 
significantly higher likelihood to be assigned to the just city cluster than mayors from 
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the Christian democratic and conservative reference group (positive coefficients in 
models 1 through 3 in Table 3). This relatively higher probability holds whether we 
take the participatory, elitist or competitive cluster as the base for comparing the 
likelihood. This finding is hardly surprising, given the fact that leftist parties’ 
manifestos usually emphasise the desirability of redistributive and inclusive policies. 
Admittedly, this same fact hints towards possibly biased coefficients due to a group-
specific social desirability effect (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). In other words, 
leftist mayors might exaggerate their support for policies that are in line with their 
parties’ manifestoes. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the full effect is only due to 
biased responses. As a general rule, we can safely assume that mayors of leftist parties 
indeed do embrace their parties’ positions more strongly than would be the case for 
mayors from centre or right wing parties.  
On the other hand, we had expected a negative effect of right wing 
membership, exposing relatively higher probabilities for being assigned to the base 
clusters, particularly to the competitive cluster (model 3). Equally, members of liberal 
parties do not significantly differ in their assignment probabilities as compared to 
their Christian democratic and conservative peers. In contrast, left wing party 
membership also explains why mayors pertain to the participatory cluster as opposed 
to the competitive cluster (model 4) – although the participatory cluster, as we know, 
lacks the decisive support for equity over growth that characterizes the just city 
cluster. 
A separate OLS regression (see appendix, Table 7) shows that party families do 
spread on the single dimensions very much in line with the political party literature. 
Left wing membership is associated positively with a preference for equity, diversity 
and democracy, while liberal mayors have a significant preference for growth (but not 
for diversity) and right wing mayors have a significant preference for both identity 
and growth. The Christian democratic and conservative mayors (reference category) 
lie somewhere in between the other groups with regard to the equity and diversity 
dimension. Yet as demonstrated above, only the combined preferences of leftist 
mayors add up to a significant association with one of the identified clusters (the just 
city cluster), demarcating themselves from the more diffusely located conservative, 
liberal and right wing mayors. 
The regression models in Table 3 also offer important insights with regard to 
the contextual factors associated with the orientations of political urban leaders. In 
line with our working hypotheses on local power structures, mayors reporting stronger 
voluntary associations expose higher probabilities for being assigned to the just city or 
participatory cluster (models 3 and 4), although the positive effect is restricted to the 
models where the competitive cluster serves as the base. Hence a strong civil society 
seems only significant for reducing the likelihood of being assigned to the competitive 
cluster, while having no effect on the assignment between the just city and the elitist 
cluster (model 2), for instance. Moreover, the likelihood of a mayor supporting the 
just city or participatory agenda is higher in core cities of larger urban agglomerations 
(Table 3, models 2 through 4), even though the negative interaction effect with 
population size means that the smaller core cities are the most likely to favour 
participatory arrangements. Here, again, the comparison with the OLS regression on 
single dimensions (appendix, Table 7) reveals that organized societal groups mainly 
call for more participatory mayoral orientations and equity, but not diversity. In 
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contrast, a strong influence of local businesspeople is associated with a stronger 
mayoral preference for growth rather than equity. 
Against our expectations, none of our regressions confirm an effect of the 
financial crisis as captured by the perceived state of municipal finances (Tables 3 and 
7). Even contrary to our hypothesis, local dependency and cooperation with the EU 
turns out not to increase but to decrease chances for being assigned to the just city 
cluster: it actually increases chances for being assigned to any other cluster (Table 3, 
models 1 through 3). The OLS regressions on the single dimensions (Table 7, 
appendix) discloses the reasons for deviating from the just city cluster. Mayors 
engaged in EU relations tend to value growth over equity. Rather than capturing the 
effect of down-load Europeanization towards values of equity and inclusion, the result 
seems to indicate the need and entitlement for supranational financial support for 
promoting much needed growth and employment, thus corroborating the conclusions 
we already drew at the national level for EU Cohesion and Pre-accession countries 
(see preceding section). At the level of cities, this conclusion is even extended to 
cities that are not entitled to Cohesion and Pre-accession funds, but rather to some 
degree of EU co-financing within the more broadly accessible European Regional 
Development Fund and the Social Fund. 
Since the effects of party ideology may interact with the further contextual 
factors discussed above, we also estimated logistic regression models for single 
subsamples split by the mayors’ party affiliation, yet this time we chose to focus on a 
dichotomous outcome of a just city assignment versus any other assignment (Table 4). 
While the analyses for the few right wing city mayors and for the more numerous 
liberal mayors do not yield any significant associations, the reported analyses for 
leftist mayors and for Christian and conservative mayors respectively reveal some 
interesting precisions regarding distinct effects for these two political camps.  
Thus, while the regression confirms that the variation within both groups is 
also associated with the individual self-positioning on the left-right scale, the 
dampening effect of a strong dependency on EU funding pertains mainly to the 
otherwise positively predisposed leftist mayors (model 2). On the other hand, the 
positive effect of (smaller) core cities appears to be mainly driven by Christian 
democratic and conservative mayors (model 3). For this subsample, this effect is even 
broader in that conservative mayors in both (smaller) core cities and (smaller) suburbs 
are more likely to adhere to the just city ideals, as compared to their conservative 
peers in more peripheral cities. A screening of the cluster assignment for cities reveals 
a threshold of approximately 100’000 inhabitants, on top of which no single city led 
by a Christian or conservative mayor adheres to the just city ideal. In Germany, for 
instance, this threshold captures the larger independent cities (“kreisfreie Städte”). 
Our interpretation is that these larger core cities – where they happen to be governed 
by Christian or conservative mayors, would see their task rather in strengthening their 
position in national and international economic competition, crowding out more 
socially oriented priorities that might be shared by Christian and conservative mayors 




Table 4: Binomial logistic regression results on mayoral adherence to just city cluster 
 (1) (2) (3) 







Party affiliation (reference: Christian/ 
conservative) 
   
- left wing 1.292***   
 (6.53)   
- liberal -0.700   
 (-1.55)   
- right wing -14.76   
 (-0.02)   
- other -0.639   
 (-1.36)   
Left-right self-positioning  -0.263** -0.463* 
  (-3.24) (-2.57) 
Age 0.00414 -0.00400 -0.0201 
 (0.46) (-0.35) (-0.83) 
Gender (0=female) -0.154 -0.108 15.92 
 (-0.67) (-0.38) (0.01) 
Education -0.110 0.0103 0.912 
 (-0.80) (0.06) (1.87) 
Influence of voluntary associations (1-5) 0.152 0.0419 0.511 
 (1.36) (0.28) (1.94) 
Influence of local businessmen (1-5) -0.110 -0.0537 -0.528* 
 (-1.05) (-0.39) (-1.97) 
Dependency and cooperation with EU (1-
5) 
-0.198** -0.262** -0.304 
 (-2.60) (-2.73) (-1.57) 
Perceived state of municipal finances (1-5) 0.0342 -0.00231 0.368 
 (0.42) (-0.02) (1.67) 
City type (reference: city beyond a larger 
functional urban area) 
   
- core city of larger functional urban area 5.789 4.434 24.84* 
 (1.73) (0.93) (2.22) 
- commuting zone of larger functional 
urban area 
3.387 -1.009 21.45* 
(1.05) (-0.25) (2.11) 
Municipal population size (log.) -0.193 -0.128 -0.114 
 (-0.91) (-0.48) (-0.21) 
- core city x population size -0.485 -0.386 -2.193* 
 (-1.52) (-0.87) (-2.08) 
- commuting zone x population size -0.309 0.120 -2.189* 
 (-0.95) (0.30) (-2.08) 
N 1046 482 308 
t statistics in parentheses. All models with country fixed effects (not reported). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 





Additionally, the separate estimation shows a new negative effect of 
influential local businesspeople for Christian and conservative mayors – thus 
expanding the effect we previously found for the dimension of equity versus growth 
(Table 7). The finding thus suggests that Christian democratic and conservative 
mayors in particular seem to be receptive to the circumstance of a strong business 
community when expressing their attitudes towards the just city. The perceived 
influence of voluntary associations, once again, does not show any significant 
associations when looking specifically at the assignment to the just city cluster.  
Conclusions and Directions for Further Research 
In this contribution, we set out to investigate the local political support for just city 
policies as captured through the single most important political city representative – 
the city mayor. Starting from the three criteria of social justice and the principles of 
just urban planning and policies as envisioned by Susan Fainstein (2010), we 
succeeded in presenting a first assessment of mayoral orientations towards the just 
city. Moreover, we were able to identify a substantial cluster of European mayors 
combining strong preferences for equity, diversity and participatory democracy – 
most clearly contrasting with mayors from the competitive cluster giving precedence 
to growth and cultural protectionism instead. 
While the descriptive analysis of cross-national variations offered limited 
insights to the contextual factors of mayoral orientations, our explanatory regression 
analyses at city level yielded striking results, partially confirming and partially 
falsifying our initial expectations. Although mayors affiliated to different party 
families mirror the party positions identified in research on the dimensionality of the 
European political landscape, clear distinctions between left wing, 
Christian/conservative, liberal and right wing politicians arise only when single 
dimensions are looked at independently from each other. Once we account for the 
combination of the three dimensions in terms of our four clusters, the differentiation 
dissolves into the distinction between left wing mayors with heightened likelihood for 
assignment to the just city cluster, and all other mayors, spread less systematically 
along the participatory, elitist and competitive clusters.  
Additionally, we find that local power structures beyond the city hall are to 
some extent related to mayoral orientations. However, strong civil societies merely 
decrease the likelihood of the assignment to the competitive cluster since it seems to 
bolster participatory and egalitarian mayoral orientations while being more 
ambiguous in its effect on the official stance towards diversity and tolerance. 
Moreover, we find that the perception of an influential business community is 
negatively associated with a mayoral preoccupation with equity and – in the case of 
Christian and conservative mayors – with the adherence to the just city ideal more 
broadly. To some extent, these results resonate with Fainstein’s scepticism towards 
participatory arrangements and broader coalitions involving business and conservative 
segments of the population. 
The urban hierarchy also plays a role, with mayors in smaller core cities being 
less likely to endorse the competitive or elitist policy agenda. Christian and 
conservative mayors in particular seem to be more open to the just city agenda when 
located in larger urban agglomerations rather than in more remote cities, even though 
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other agendas come to the top when located in cities with more than 100’000 
inhabitants. No clear effect is found for the municipal fiscal situation, yet – our most 
surprising finding – leftist mayors in cities accessing European funding are less likely 
to adhere to a just city agenda, given their preoccupation with creating growth and 
employment. 
Although mayors engaging with the EU might rightly be concerned with 
growth and creating job opportunities, balancing these economic aims with more 
social considerations in these same cities appears as an important task for the various 
EU funding schemes. Despite enduring efforts of strengthening the urban dimension 
in EU cohesion policies and of enforcing integrated and locally empowering 
instruments of urban renewal and diversity management (Atkinson, 2015; Scheurer 
and Haase, 2018), our analyses indicate a continued sectoral and one-sided – 
competitiveness-oriented – approach that is often pursued by local authorities making 
use of the funding opportunities offered by the European Union. Of course, our 
assessment is limited to the expressed position of mayors, so it may well be that the 
actual implementation of EU programmes does indeed serve their purpose of equity 
and diversity, even if mayoral attitudes are left unchanged. 
So, relating back to the rationale motivating this research paper: where are the 
fertile grounds for realizing the just cities of tomorrow? The answer seems clear: we 
find these in cities governed by the left, as well as under favourable conditions in 
cities governed by Christian or conservative parties. Although the actual adoption and 
successful implementation will be greatly facilitated in a context of economic 
prosperity and relevant local competences and capacities, we should not easily discard 
the seeds for creatively developing more equity and diversity oriented urban policies 
that have evidently spread even under less favourable or even crisis-prone conditions. 
It is exactly under these conditions, that equity and diversity sensitive policies are 
most needed. Mixed-income housing developments, social impact assessments and 
high quality public schools and services, coupled with societal openness and non-
discrimination towards immigrants and minorities, would arguably contribute to the 
creation of economically resilient local communities (Taşan-Kok et al., 2017).  
More research is necessary for assessing and understanding commitment to 
and enactment of just city policies more thoroughly. Detailed case studies in which 
the actual policy-making of just policies or city plans is analysed in detail, including 
all relevant actors involved, their interests and the role of the political-institutional 
context, could provide additional insights. Since a variety of factors influence the 
concrete policies, a method like process-tracing might be helpful to disentangle the 
contribution of each of them. The selection of case study cities would stretch across 
the political spectrum, both within and between countries, with the research applying 
a mixed methods approach to capture not only the attitudes through the survey data, 
but also reactions to implemented urban policies, to explore the conjuncture of factors 
which affect the support for just city policies.  
In particular, it would be interesting to explore further the finding here related 
to leftist mayors in cities accessing European funding who, it appears, are less likely 
to support the just city agenda. A more in-depth qualitative approach could tease out 
the complexities of the intersection between political party affiliation, attitudes 
towards the just city, the use of particular EU funding schemes and the 
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implementation of just city policies, including an analysis of the broader local 
politico-institutional context in which the mayor is embedded. Such research could 
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Table 5: Operationalization, question wording and scale of independent variables 
(POLLEADER II) 
Variable name Question wording Scale 










-  left wing political 
party 
 
-  Christian and 
conservative party 
-  liberal party 
-  right wing 
 
-  other 
Are you presently a party member? If you answered 
«yes» to the previous question: of which party?  
Each answer was assigned by country experts to one of 
13 categories according to a scheme of European party 
families developed by Andersson et al. (2014): 
Communist parties; Left-socialist parties; Social 
democratic parties; Green parties; Agrarian parties; 
Regional, Separatist or ethno-nationalist parties; 
Liberal parties; Christian parties; Conservative parties; 
Right wing parties; Extreme right wing parties; Special 
interest parties and others; Independent / local party. 
Including the four categories communist parties, left-
socialist parties, social democratic parties and green 
parties 
Including the two categories Christian parties and 
conservative parties 
Identical with liberal party 
Including the two categories right wing parties and 
extreme right wing parties 
Summarizing the remaining categories: agrarian 
parties; regional, separatist or ethno-nationalist 
parties; special interest parties and others; 





















Age Age: Please write your answer Number of years 
Gender Gender: Tick box for female or for male 0=”Female” 
1=”Male” 
Education What is your highest completed education? 







Influence of voluntary 
associations 
Concluding, on the basis of your experience as a Mayor 
in this City, and independently from the formal 
procedures, please indicate how influential each of the 
following actors are over the Local Authority activities? 
Please choose the appropriate response for each 
item… Voluntary associations 
1 (no influence) to 5 
(highly influence) 
Influence of local 
businessmen 
Concluding, on the basis of your experience as a Mayor 
in this City, and independently from the formal 
procedures, please indicate how influential each of the 
following actors are over the Local Authority activities? 
Please choose the appropriate response for each 
item…. Local businessmen 
1 (no influence) to 5 
(highly influence) 
Dependency and 
cooperation with EU 
If you consider this most important challenge: to what 
extent would you say that your administration depends 
on the cooperation and support of the different actors 
below in addressing this problem 
Dependent upon cooperation or support of… The EU 
and other supranational organizations 
1 (no dependency) to 
5 (highly dependent) 
24 
 
Perceived state of 
municipal finances 
How would describe the financial situation of your 
municipality? Please choose the appropriate response 
for each item: 
1 (very poor) to 5 
(very good) 
City type Location within a functional urban area/larger urban 
zone based on EUROSTAT 2011. Three categories have 
been built. 
1=”(Greater) city of a functional urban area” 
2=”Commuting zone of a functional urban area” 









Log transformation of number of inhabitants of each of 
the cities 
Ranges from a 
minimum of 9.2 to the 
maximum of 14.9 
 
Table 6: Operationalization, question wording and scale of dependent variables 
(POLLEADER II) 
Variable name Question wording Scale 
Equity over growth Factor analysis of four items: 
• Below are a number of challenges that many 
municipalities are facing. For each challenge 
please indicate the degree to which it is an 
important priority on the policy agenda of you 
as a mayor during your current term of office: 
To develop social policies to secure adequate 
housing, health care, education, public 
transport facilities and take care of the needs 
of vulnerable groups (the elderly, the young, 
the unemployed etc.) 
• Public service delivery (index): Average value 
of four items (public transport, maintenance 
of school buildings, hospitals, care homes for 
the elderly) with theoretical minimum of 
1=”private sector” and maximum of 3=”public 
sector” 
• Agreement to the statement “The market is 
the best way to attend housing needs”, 
ranging from 1=”strongly agree” to 
5=”strongly disagree” (scale reversed) 
• Question about mayoral strategies: Among 
the following options, which strategies are in 
your opinion, those most likely to succeed?: 
anticipate the environmental and social 
impacts of projects, ranging from 0=”least 
important” to 3=”most important” 
From this analysis, one factor could be retained with an 
Eigenvalue above 1. It was standardized to a minimum 
of 0 and a maximum of 100.  
Finally, the priority of the agenda To stimulate 
economic growth and employment, likewise 
standardized to the range 0 to 100 was subtracted 
from the factor and the resulting variable was 




standardized again to the range -50 to +50 
Diversity over 
traditional identity 
A question with the following introduction was taken:  
Below are a number of challenges that many 
municipalities are facing. For each challenge please 
indicate the degree to which it is an important priority 
on the policy agenda of you as a mayor during your 
current term of office. A score of 1 indicates a “Low 
priority” and a score of 5 indicates the “High priority”. 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Finally, the agenda priority of To preserve the local 
identity and the locality’s traditional lifestyle was 
subtracted from the agenda priority of To improve the 
integration of ethnic, religious or cultural minorities 
and emphasize diversity and tolerance in the local 
community. Resulting values were standardized to the 
range -50 to +50 
-50 (traditional 




Factor analysis of three items: 
• Agreement with the statement Apart from 
voting, citizens should not be given the 
opportunity to influence local government 
policies ranging from 1=”strongly agree” to 
5=”strongly disagree” (scale reversed) 
• Agreement with the statement Residents 
should have the opportunity to make their 
views known before important local decisions 
are made by elected representatives ranging 
from 1=”strongly disagree” to 5=”strongly 
agree” 
• Question about mayoral strategies: Among 
the following options, which strategies are in 
your opinion, those most likely to succeed?: 
involve local society in defining territorial 
priorities, ranging from 0=”least important” to 
3=”most important” 
Finally, resulting values were standardized to the range 
-50 to 50 
-50 (democracy least 









Table 7: OLS regression models on mayoral orientations towards single dimensions 
of a just city 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Equity over  
growth 





Party affiliation (reference: Christian/ 
conservative) 
   
- left wing 10.04*** 5.830*** 5.112*** 
 (11.16) (5.95) (4.54) 
- liberal -5.148** -0.656 1.842 
 (-2.83) (-0.33) (0.81) 
- right wing -7.476* -11.51** 1.871 
 (-2.07) (-2.86) (0.41) 
- other 1.573 0.00845 5.230** 
 (1.02) (0.00) (2.69) 
Age 0.0762 0.00580 -0.0453 
 (1.79) (0.12) (-0.85) 
Gender (0=female) -0.872 -1.258 3.010* 
 (-0.77) (-1.03) (2.13) 
Education 0.622 0.845 0.936 
 (0.89) (1.11) (1.08) 
Influence of voluntary associations (1-5) 1.340* 0.726 2.298*** 
 (2.55) (1.27) (3.50) 
Influence of local businessmen (1-5) -1.262* -0.238 -0.307 
 (-2.48) (-0.43) (-0.48) 
Dependency and cooperation with EU (1-
5) 
-0.952** 0.576 0.326 
 (-2.62) (1.45) (0.71) 
Perceived state of municipal finances (1-5) 0.507 -0.611 0.184 
(1.32) (-1.47) (0.39) 
City type (reference: city beyond a larger 
functional urban area) 
   
- core city of larger functional urban area 15.35 19.06 22.99 
 (1.04) (1.20) (1.25) 
- commuting zone of larger functional 
urban area 
20.62 14.78 9.361 
(1.36) (0.89) (0.50) 
Municipal population size (log.) -1.160 1.980 1.220 
 (-1.24) (1.92) (1.03) 
- core city x population size -1.169 -1.731 -2.133 
 (-0.85) (-1.16) (-1.23) 
- commuting zone x population size -1.844 -1.529 -0.928 
 (-1.21) (-0.92) (-0.49) 
Constant -5.381 -22.86* -10.04 
 (-0.54) (-2.08) (-0.80) 
N 1092 1164 1119 
t statistics in parentheses. All models with country fixed effects (not reported). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 





Table 8: Duda / Hart indices according to Ward’s method (Stata 14.2) 
Number of clusters Je(2)/Je(1) pseudo T-squared 
1 0.7385 677.93 
2 0.7618 390.35 
3 0.7872 213.77 
4 0.7794 188.17 
5 0.6553 239.35 
6 0.6012 214.94 
7 0.7064 158.39 
8 0.7476 156.95 
9 0.5976 167.00 
10 0.6305 170.57 
 
Table 9: Comparison of clustering results 
    K-means     
    Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Total   
Ward's 
method 
Cluster 1 341 73.0 77 16.5 42 9.0 7 1.5 467 100.0 
Cluster 2 147 45.1 171 52.5 6 1.8 2 0.6 326 100.0 
Cluster 3 17 3.7 274 60.0 154 33.7 12 2.6 457 100.0 
Cluster 4 4 0.6 92 13.8 142 21.3 429 64.3 667 100.0 




Table 10: Multicollinearity in the multinomial logistic regression 
Variable VIF Tolerance 
Party affiliation   
- left wing 5.00 0.20 
- liberal 14.11 0.07 
- right wing 1.20 0.84 
- other 2.30 0.44 
Age 1.04 0.96 
Gender 1.04 0.96 
Education 1.04 0.96 
Influence of voluntary associations 1.91 0.52 
Influence of local businessmen 1.33 0.75 
Dependency and cooperation with EU 1.13 0.88 
Perceived state of municipal finances 1.02 0.98 
City type   
- core city of larger functional area 178.79 0.006 
- commuting zone of larger functional urban area 372.49 0.003 
Municipal population size (log.) 3.74 0.27 
- core city x population size (interaction) 198.26 0.01 
- commuting zone x population size (interaction) 370.89 0.00 
 
Table 11: Test for combining dependent categories (LR test) 
Alternatives tested chi2 df P>chi2 
Just City Participatory 85.738 17 0 
Just City Elitist 75.949 17 0 
Just City Competitive 158.294 17 0 
Participatory Elitist 27.817 17 0.047 
Participatory Competitive 77.842 17 0 
Competitive Elitist 55.04 19 0 
 
 
